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Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in North East Asia 
In 2017 the Hiroshima Roundtable of experts and former officials met to discuss pathways towards 
nuclear disarmament in East Asia. The deterioration in United States (US) WĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ WĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ
Republic of Korea (DPRK) ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶ ? ? ? ?ƉƌĞĐŝƉŝƚĂƚĞĚďǇWǇŽŶŐǇĂŶŐ ?ƐƚĞĐŚŶŽlogical advances in 
thermonuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles featured heavily.1 dŚĞ ŚĂŝƌŵĂŶ ?Ɛ
concluding statement suggested that to deter the DPRK, the US and its allies need not rely, or state 
publicly their reliance, on nuclear weapons due to the range of conventional deterrence options at 
their disposal.2 This paper, commissioned by UNIDIR and the Hiroshima Prefecture, examines the 
extent to which the US can reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its strategy towards the DPRK. 
The primary concern is one of reducing the risks of nuclear violence in North East Asia in part by 
reducing the role of nuclear weapons. The broader context is the challenge of creating propitious 
conditions for progress on nuclear disarmament in antagonistic circumstances in which nuclear 
weapons remain highly valued.  
This paper is primarily concerned with steps the US, alongside the ROK (Republic of Korea), could 
take to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its strategy towards the DPRK. Reducing the role of 
nuclear weapons means diminishing their importance or significance in the security strategies, 
ĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞƐ ?ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚƐŚĂƉĞĞĂĐŚƐŝĚĞƐ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŝƚƐ
ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?/ƚŝƐĂďŽƵƚ “ĚĞŶƵĐůĞĂƌŝǌŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚĚǇŶĂŵŝĐƐŝĨŶŽƚ ƚŚĞĂŶƚĂŐŽŶŝƐƚƐ ?ĂĐƚƵĂůĂƌŵŽƵƌŝĞƐ ?
Moreover, reducing the role, in particular by ruling out the use of nuclear weapons as the final move 
in any escalating conflict, allows non-nuclear and potentially non-violent policies to assume greater 
priority. It is, of course, a challenging proposition in the current environment. This paper argues that 
reducing the role of nuclear weapons is possible for the US because its nuclear weapons are not a 
necessary component of its war-fighting plans or its wider deterrence posture towards the DPRK. 
The US could therefore take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its confrontation with 
ƚŚĞWZ<ďǇ “ĚĞŶƵĐůĞĂƌŝǌŝŶŐ ?ŝƚƐǁĂƌƉůĂŶƐĂŶĚĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƐĂŶĚĞǆƚĞŶĚŝŶŐĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞƐ
to Pyongyang.  
Of course, there are two main protagonists in the confrontation, and this paper also looks briefly at 
short-term steps the DPRK could take to reduce the role of nuclear weapons and the risk of nuclear 
violence. Over the longer term, this will likely require a process of developing and institutionalizing 
a non-confrontational security relationship with the US, ROK and Japan (something that will be 
challenging, but not impossible to do). This paper does not provide a detailed explanation of the 
WZ< ?ƐŶƵĐůĞĂƌ weapons programme or its rationales and perceptions; the steps it might take that 
are outlined towards the end should be read in the context of the current phase of its confrontation 
with the US.3 China also has an important, if less direct, role to play in reducing the role of nuclear 
weapons given its relationship with Pyongyang. 
This paper begins by outlining reasons why reducing the role of nuclear weapons is important in 
terms of the pathologies of nuclear deterrence on the Korean peninsula, before exploring how and 
why the US might take a lead. It concludes by outlining steps that the DPRK and China could take to 
reduce the role of nuclear weapons and the risk of nuclear violence. 
                                                            
1 &ŽƌĂƐƵŵŵĂƌǇƐĞĞ:ƵŶũŝŬĞĐŚŝ ? “,ŝƌŽƐŚŝŵĂZŽƵŶĚƚĂďůĞ,ŽůĚƐŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐŽŶEƵĐůĞĂƌŝƐĂƌŵĂŵĞŶƚŝŶĂƐƚƐŝĂ ? ?,ŝƌŽƐŚŝŵĂWĞĂĐĞ 
Media Center, 2 August 2017, http://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/?p=76088. 
2 ^ĞĞƚŚĞŚĂŝƌ ?Ɛ^ƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?,ŝƌŽƐŚŝŵĂZŽƵŶĚƚĂďůĞ ? ? W2 August 2017, Hiroshima, 
http://www.pref.hiroshima.lg.jp/uploaded/attachment/251972.pdf. 
3 For detailed analysis of the DPRK nuclear programme, see chapter six in Etel Solingen, Nuclear logics: Contrasting Paths in East 
Asia and the Middle East, 2007, pp. 118 W140; and Jonathan Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International 
Security, Adelphi paper 418, 2010. For a debate on US policy towards the DPRK, see Victor Cha and David Kang, Nuclear North 
Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies, 2003. 
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Three reasons for reducing the role of nuclear weapons  
in the USʹROKʹDPRK confrontation 
First, nuclear deterrence is becoming ever more embedded in the US WROK WDPRK relationship, and 
this brings with it the possibility of nuclear violence. Indeed, planning for nuclear war is inherent to 
nuclear deterrence since the desired deterrent effect is conditioned upon the credibility of the 
threat to use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances. For the US, nuclear weapons are perceived 
as necessary to deter DPRK aggression, to reassure its treaty allies by maximizing the perceived 
credibility of its extended deterrence commitments, and to reproduce its identity as a global 
hegemon rooted in unassailable military power.4 Nuclear deterrence is framed as an essential 
structure for the US and its allies within which the political goal of complete and irreversible 
denuclearization of the DPRK might be pursued. From this standpoint, any reduction in the role of 
nuclear weapons risks undermining deterrence and therefore the security of the US and its allies, 
particularly the ROK and Japan, and inviting dangerous and destabilizing tests of resolve from 
Pyongyang.  
&ŽƌƚŚĞWZ< ?ŶƵĐůĞĂƌĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞƚŚĞĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞǁŝƚŚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĂ “ŶŽƌŵĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?
of political relations with the US might be pursued and the survival of both the DPRK as a State and 
the Kim dynasty ensured. Nuclear weapons are symptomatic of the extreme militarization of state 
ĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĞƚǇƌŽŽƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞWZ< ?Ɛsongun (military first) policy that rests on its juche (self-reliance) 
ideology. The specific role of nuclear weapons crystallized further with Kim Jong-ƵŶ ?Ɛbyungjin 
(parallel development) policy inaugurated in 2013 that promotes the parallel advance of economic 
growth and the development of an effective nuclear weapons capability.5 
But framing the US WDPRK relationship in terms of nuclear deterrence has deleterious consequences. 
It tends to take worst-case assumptions for granted and narrow the range of policy options to 
threats and military containment at the expense of other broad options such as securing 
cooperative behaviour.6 Moreover, a constant need to make the deterrent threat credible can 
normalize intransigence and discourage negotiation and compromise. The practice of nuclear 
deterrence can also drive leaders much closer to disaster through brinkmanship in attempts to 
maximize the credibility of the deterrent threat and through mutual misperception.7  
Second, the US approach to nuclear deterrence on the peninsula could lead to perceptions that war 
is the only option. The US currently embraces the security logic of nuclear deterrence for itself and 
ŝƚƐ ĂůůŝĞƐ ďƵƚ ĚĞŶŝĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ůŽŐŝĐ ƚŽ ŽƚŚĞƌ ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ ƚŚŽƐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ƐĞĞƐ ĂƐ  “ƌŽŐƵĞ ? ? ^ƚĂďůĞ
deterrence on the peninsula for the US is framed in terms of its nuclear monopoly over the 
peninsula. One-way nuclear deterrence is both necessary and acceptable but mutual nuclear 
deterrence is rejected as destabilizing (contra deterrence theorists) and politically unacceptable ?
not necessarily (or only) because it might prove unstable, but because it limits US freedom of action 
as a hegemonic power. This is a long-standing feature of US nuclear weapons policy and counter-
proliferation policy and reflects the discriminatory logic that is also embedded in the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).8 
                                                            
4 ĂƌƌǇWŽƐĞŶ “ŽŵŵĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞŽŵŵŽŶƐ ? ?International Security 28:1, 2003, pp. 5 W46. 
5 &ŽƌĂŶŽǀĞƌǀŝĞǁƐĞĞŶƚŚŽŶǇŽƌĚĞƐŵĂŶ ? “dŚĞDŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂůĂŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞ<ŽƌĞĂƐĂŶĚEŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂ ? ?ĞŶƚĞƌĨŽƌ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂŶĚ
International Studies, January 2017. 
6 DŝĐŚĂĞůDĐĐ'ǁŝƌĞ ? ?ĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞ PdŚĞWƌŽďůĞŵŶŽƚƚŚĞ^ŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?International Affairs 62:1, 1986, pp. 55 W70 
7 ĞŶŽŝƚWĞůŽƉŝĚĂƐ ? “ĞƚWŽƌƚƌĂǇĞĚĂƐĂĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ? ?ŝŶ^ŚƵůƚǌ ?' ?ĂŶĚ'ŽŽĚďǇ ?: ? ?ĞĚƐ ) ?The War that Must Never Be Fought, 2015, 
p. 20; Robert Jervis and Mira Rapp-,ŽŽƉĞƌ ? “WĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂŶĚDŝƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞ<ŽƌĞĂŶWĞŶŝƐƵůĂ P,ŽǁhŶǁĂŶƚĞĚtĂƌƐĞŐŝŶ ? ?
Foreign Affairs, 5 April 2018. 
8 EŝĐŬZŝƚĐŚŝĞ ? “>ĞŐŝƚŝŵŝƐŝŶŐĂŶĚĞůĞŐŝƚŝŵŝƐŝŶŐEƵĐůĞĂƌtĞĂƉŽŶƐ ?ŝŶŽƌƌŝĞ ?: ?ĂŶĚĂƵŐŚůĞǇ ?d ? ?ĞĚƐ ) ?Viewing Nuclear Weapons 
through a Humanitarian Lens, UNIDIR, 2013, pp. 44 W77. 
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Sustaining such an approach can lead to the perceived necessity of violent counter-proliferation by 
the US in the face of persistent resistance to permanent, coerced nuclear subordination. The 
alternative is to tacitly accept mutual nuclear deterrence by downgrading the unacceptable to the 
undesirable. After the 11 September 2001 attacks, for example, US policymakers insisted that Iraq 
had a viable weapon of mass destruction (WMD) programme, that Saddam Hussein was 
undeterrable, and that the threat he posed was unacceptable. This left a military attack to eliminate 
the WMD programme as the only remaining option. 
A similar dynamic has been at work with the DPRK over the past year. Following the technological 
breakthroughs and external support that have enabled Pyongyang to develop a thermonuclear 
threat to the US, policymakers such as former National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster insisted 
that the DPRK was undeterrable.9 In late 2017 the Trump administration reportedly explored the 
ŽƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŐŝǀŝŶŐWǇŽŶŐǇĂŶŐĂ  “ďůŽŽĚǇŶŽƐĞ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚŽƌ  “ƐƵƌŐŝĐĂů ?ƐƚƌŝŬĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŽŶĞŽƌ
more missile and nuclear facilities.10 Some of the proponents of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, such 
as current National Security Advisor and former Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton and 
Senator Lindsay Graham, have also argued that the time is right for a preventative attack to 
ƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĂƚŽĨWǇŽŶŐǇĂŶŐ ?ƐŶƵĐůĞĂƌĂŶĚŵŝƐƐŝůĞƉƌŽŐƌĂŵmes once and for all.11 This is part 
of a longer history of US plans for a limited, preventative, conventional counter-proliferation 
attack ?ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ EŝǆŽŶ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ  “KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ &ƌĞĞĚŽŵ ƌŽƉ ?ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ?12 to the Clinton 
administration in 1994,13 and the Bush administration in 2003.14 
Third, the consequences of a nuclear war would be devastating. A full-scale conventional war with 
the DPRK would be ruinous enough without the use of nuclear weapons. It would likely cause 
casualties into the hundreds of thousands, and perhaps over a million, create millions of refugees, 
cause a massive humanitarian crisis for an already impoverished population, and probably transition 
into an enduring insurgency.15 It would leave large parts of Seoul destroyed and have a significant 
impact on the regional and global economy.16 The DPRK could also saturate Seoul and surrounding 
areas with its stockpile of chemical agents, including sarin and VX.17 As US Defence Secretary James 
DĂƚƚŝƐƐĂŝĚ ?ĂǁĂƌǁŝƚŚƚŚĞWZ< “ǁŽƵůĚďĞƉƌŽďĂďůǇƚŚĞǁorst kind of fighting in most people's 
                                                            
9 hƌŝ&ƌŝĞĚŵĂŶ ? “ĂŶŵĞƌŝĐĂ>ŝǀĞǁŝƚŚĂEƵĐůĞĂƌEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ ? ? ?The Atlantic, 14 September 2017, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/north-korea-nuclear-deterrence/539205/. 
10 Zachary Cohen, Nicole Gaouette, Barbara Starr and <ĞǀŝŶ>ŝƉƚĂŬ ? “dƌƵŵƉĚǀŝƐĞƌƐůĂƐŚŽǀĞƌ ‘ůŽŽĚǇEŽƐĞ ?^ƚƌŝŬĞŽŶEŽƌƚŚ
<ŽƌĞĂ ? ?CNN, 1 February 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/02/01/politics/north-korea-trump-bloody-nose-dispute/index.html; 
ĂǀŝĚ^ĂŶŐĞƌ ? “dĂůŬŽĨ ‘WƌĞǀĞŶƚŝǀĞtĂƌ ?ZŝƐĞƐŝŶtŚŝƚĞ,ŽƵƐĞŽǀĞƌEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ ? ?New York Times, 20 August 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/20/world/asia/north-korea-war-trump.html. 
11 ^ŽƉŚŝĞdĂƚƵŵ ? “'ƌĂŚĂŵŽŶEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ P ‘tĞ ?ƌĞ ,ĞĂĚĞĚƚŽĂtĂƌ/ĨdŚŝŶŐƐŽŶ ?ƚŚĂŶŐĞ ? ? ?CNN, 29 November 2017, 
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/28/politics/lindsey-graham-north-korea/index.html ?:ŽŚŶŽůƚŽŶ ? “dŚĞ>ĞŐĂůĂƐĞĨŽƌ^ƚƌŝŬŝŶŐ
EŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ&ŝƌƐƚ ? ?The Wall Street Journal, 28 February 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-legal-case-for-striking-north-
korea-first-1519862374 ?^ĞĞĂůƐŽĚǁĂƌĚ>ƵƚƚǁĂŬ ? “/ƚ ?ƐdŝŵĞƚŽŽŵďEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ ? ?Foreign Policy, 8 January 2018; and Peter Pry, 
 “/ƚ ?ƐdŝŵĞĨŽƌĂDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ^ŽůƵƚŝŽŶƚŽEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ ? ?The Hill, 11 December 2017, http://thehill.com/opinion/national-
security/364239-It%27s-time-for-a-military-solution-to-North-Korea.  
12 WĞƚĞƌ&ŽƐƚĞƌ ? “ZŝĐŚĂƌĚEŝǆŽŶWůĂŶŶĞĚEƵĐůĞĂƌ^ƚƌŝŬĞŽŶEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ ? ?The Daily Telegraph, 8 July 2010. 
13 :ĂŵŝĞDĐ/ŶƚǇƌĞ ? “tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶtĂƐŽŶƌŝŶŬŽĨtĂƌǁŝƚŚEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ ?zĞĂƌƐŐŽ ? ?CNN, 4 October 1999, 
http://edition.cnn.com/US/9910/04/korea.brink/. 
14 ĂǀŝĚ^ĂŶŐĞƌĂŶĚƌŝĐ^ĐŚŵŝƚƚ ? “dŚƌĞĂƚƐĂŶĚZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ PEƵĐůĞĂƌ^ƚĂŶĚ-ŽĨĨ ? ?New York Times, 31 January 2003, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/31/world/threats-responses-nuclear-standoff-satellites-said-see-activity-north-korean.html; 
^ĞǇŵŽƵƌ,ĞƌƐŚ ? “dŚĞŽůĚdĞƐƚ ? ?The New Yorker, 27 January 2003,  
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2003/01/27/the-cold-test. 
15 HeleŶŽŽƉĞƌĂŶĚƌŝĐ^ĐŚŵŝƚƚ ? “h ?^ ?ĂŶŬƐŽŶŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇǁŝƚŚEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ ?ďƵƚDŽǀĞƐŚĞĂĚŽŶDŝůŝƚĂƌǇWůĂŶƐ ? ?New York 
Times ? ? ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?ZŽďŝŶtƌŝŐŚƚ ? “tŚĂƚtŽƵůĚtĂƌǁŝƚŚEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ>ŽŽŬ>ŝŬĞ ? ? ?The New Yorker, 6 September 2017; 
ƌƵĐĞĞŶŶĞƚ ? “^ƵƌŐŝĐĂů^ƚƌŝŬĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ ?EŽƚĂŶKƉƚŝŽŶ ? ?RAND blog, 14 July 2017, 
https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/07/a-surgical-strike-against-north-korea-not-a-viable.html. 
16 ^ĐŽƚƚ^ƚŽƐƐĞů ? “EŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ PdŚĞtĂƌ'ĂŵĞ ? ?The Atlantic, July/August 2005.  
17 &ŽƌĂŶŽǀĞƌǀŝĞǁƐĞĞEƵĐůĞĂƌdŚƌĞĂƚ/ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ? “EŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ PŚĞŵŝĐĂů ? ?December 2017, 
http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/chemical/. 
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ůŝĨĞƚŝŵĞƐ ?the bottom line is it would be a catastrophic war ? ?18 A war that escalated to the use of 
nuclear weapons would be even more disastrous and cause many millions of casualties.19 Reducing 
the risk of nuclear conflict is therefore paramount given the foreseeable and devastating 
humanitarian, economic, and environmental effects of nuclear use, particularly if nuclear weapons 
were detonated in or near populated areas. 
Using nuclear weapons against the DPRK 
The very real risks of nuclear violence prompt serious thinking about reducing the role of nuclear 
weapons in the current confrontation. Here, the US could take specific steps to reduce the role of 
nuclear weapons in war-planning against the DPRK. There are three reasons for focusing on the US. 
First, the use of US nuclear weapons in a war with the DPRK would be unnecessary. This is because, 
second, the US and its allies are operating from a position of profound military, economic, and 
political strength compared to the DPRK. This stark asymmetry in power gives Washington more 
options and leeway when it comes to the role of nuclear weapons and underlines its profound 
responsibility for ensuring that nuclear weapons are never used. Third, the asymmetry of interests 
at stake (i.e. survival, in the case of the Kim regime) means that the DPRK currently has little interest 
ŝŶƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ?ďƵƚŝŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌƌŽůĞŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĚĞƚĞƌĂh^ĂƚƚĂĐŬ “ĂƐ
Ă ŵĂƚƚĞƌ ŽĨ ůŝĨĞ Žƌ ĚĞĂƚŚ ? ?20 This does not exonerate the DPRK of responsibility but instead 
emphasizes the leadership opportunities and, arguably, obligations of the US. The following sections 
develop the case for denuclearizing US war plans with respect to the DPRK before discussing the 
role of reassurance in reducing the role of nuclear weapons. 
Any use of nuclear weapons by the US and DPRK would in all likelihood be part of an all-out war 
between the US WROK and DPRK that escalated from lower levels of conventional aggression by the 
DPRK (of which it has a long history) or a limited, preventative, conventional counter-proliferation 
attack by the US.21 It is extremely unlikely that the US, ROK, or DPRK would launch a surprise all-out 
war, but we can imagine plausible pathways from a low level of conflict to nuclear use.22 
The US has a long history of planning for the use of nuclear weapons against so-ĐĂůůĞĚ “ƌŽŐƵĞ ?^ ƚĂƚĞƐ
armed with weapons of mass destruction, particularly Iraq, Iran, and the DPRK.23 Following the 
Korean War the US deployed hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons in the ROK before withdrawing 
them in 1991.24 h^ŶƵĐůĞĂƌƚĂƌŐĞƚŝŶŐŽĨ “ƌŽŐƵĞ ?^ƚĂƚĞƐĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞŽůĚtĂƌĐĞŶƚƌĞĚŽŶĚĞƐƚƌŽǇŝŶŐ
 “ŚĂƌĚĞŶĞĚĂŶĚĚĞĞƉůǇďƵƌŝĞĚƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ? ?,dƐ )ƚŚĂƚŚŽuse leadership bunkers; chemical, biological 
and nuclear weapons and delivery systems; and command and control facilities. These types of 
facility cannot be destroyed with conventional weapons but could be destroyed with earth-
penetrating nuclear weapons. The 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review, for example, included a specific 
ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ  “ƚĂŝůŽƌĞĚ ĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ WZ< ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐhardened and deeply buried military and 
                                                            
18 ^EĞǁƐ ? “dƌĂŶƐĐƌŝƉƚ PĞĨĞŶƐĞ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ:ĂŵĞƐDĂƚƚŝƐŽŶ ‘&ĂĐĞƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?DĂǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?DĂǇ ? ? ? ? ?Ăƚ
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-defense-secretary-james-mattis-on-face-the-nation-may-28-2017/. 
19 DŝĐŚĂĞůĂŐƵƌĂŬ ? “,ǇƉŽƚŚĞƚŝĐĂůEƵĐůĞĂƌƚƚĂĐŬŽŶ^ĞŽƵůĂŶĚdŽŬǇŽ PdŚĞ,ƵŵĂŶŽƐƚŽĨtĂƌŽŶƚŚĞ<ŽƌĞĂŶWĞŶŝŶƐƵůĂ ? ?
38 North, 4 October 2017, https://www.38north.org/2017/10/mzagurek100417/. 
20 See remarks by Choe Son Hui, head of US affairs at the DPRK Foreign Ministry, at the Moscow Non-Proliferation Conference, 19 W
20 October 2017, 
http://cenessrussia.org/ceness/transcripts/8_The%202017%20MNC%20Transcript%20Security%20in%20Northeast%20Asia%20ENG.pdf. 
21 ^ĞĞZŽďĞƌƚ:ĞƌǀŝƐ ? “Unpacking a US Decision to͒hƐĞ&ŽƌĐĞŐĂŝŶƐƚEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ ? ? ? ?EŽƌƚŚ ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? 
22 &ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?WŚŝůŝƉ'ŽƌĚŽŶ ? “sŝƐŝŽŶŽĨdƌƵŵƉĂƚtĂƌ ? ?Foreign Affairs, 27 March 2017, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-03-22/vision-trump-war ?:ĞĨĨƌĞǇ>ĞǁŝƐ ? “dŚŝƐŝƐŚŽǁŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĂƌǁŝƚŚEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ
ǁŽƵůĚƵŶĨŽůĚ ? ?The Washington Post, 8 December 2017. 
23 See Hans Kristensen ĂŶĚ:ŽƐŚƵĂ,ĂŶĚůĞƌ ? “dŚĞh^ĂŶĚĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ-ƉƌŽůŝĨĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ PĂŶĞǁĂŶĚĚƵďŝŽƵƐƌŽůĞĨŽƌh ?^ ?ŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ? ?
Security Dialogue 27:4, 1996, pp. 387 W99; Nick Ritchie, US Nuclear Weapons Policy after the Cold War, 2008, pp. 59 W66. 
24 See Hans Kristensen and RobeƌƚEŽƌƌŝƐ ? “ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨh^ŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ ? ?Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 73:6, 2017, pp. 349 W357.  
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ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŽůĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ŝŶƐŝƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ  “ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐǁŝůůĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽĨŝĞůĚĂƌĂŶge of 
ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚŶƵĐůĞĂƌĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂďůĞƚŽŚŽůĚƐƵĐŚƚĂƌŐĞƚƐĂƚƌŝƐŬ ? ?25  
If the US were to use nuclear weapons to attack DPRK HDBTs, it would likely use its only nuclear 
 “ďƵŶŬĞƌ ďƵƐƚĞƌ ? ǁĞĂƉŽŶ P Ă ƐƚŽĐŬƉŝůĞ ŽĨ  ? ?  ? ?-11 bombs developed in the 1990s that can 
penetrate 5 W8 metres into the ground with a variable explosive yield of up to 400 kilotons.26 A US 
nuclear attack against multiple HDBTs that could not be destroyed or incapacitated with 
conventional weapons would likely involve multiple nuclear detonations at multiple locations in the 
DPRK.27 
Beyond targeting HDBTs, the US might also consider the use of lower yield nuclear weapons, such 
as the B61-3 and B61-4, with a range of yields from 0.3 to 170 kilotons, against DPRK ground forces 
in the event that US and ROK forces were in danger of defeat. This would appear unlikely given US W
ROK advantages in firepower, technology, intelligence, training, and resilience, but a local defeat 
scenario is not implausible.28  
Nuclear weapons might also be used to try to destroy a facility thought to contain chemical or 
biological weapons.29 Nuclear weapons might have a better chance of destroying the facility 
compared to conventional weapons depending on the extent of hardening and depth of the facility 
below the surface. There have been repeated calls in US nuclear debates for the development of 
low-ǇŝĞůĚŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĂŶĚ  “ŵŝŶŝ-ŶƵŬĞƐ ? ĨŽƌďĂƚƚůĞĨŝĞůĚƵƐĞ ŝŶ ƐƵĐŚƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐ ?dŚŝƐ ŝƐŝŶƉĂƌƚ
because high-yield multiple-warhead strategic nuclear weapons were deemed unsuitable for 
ĚĞƚĞƌƌŝŶŐ “ƌŽŐƵĞ ?States.30  
Limits and consequences of nuclear weapon use by the US 
The efficacy of the US using nuclear weapons in the Korean context is, however, very limited. For 
HDBTs, Ivan Oelrich et al. argue that there is a narrow band oĨĚĞƉƚŚƚŚĂƚŝƐ “ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƚŚĂŶĐĂŶďĞ
attacked with conventional weapons but not so deep as to be out of reach even of nuclear 
ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ? ?31 They calculate that a B61-11 could destroy lined tunnels dug into a granite mountain 
up to 300 metres deep and unlined tunnels up to 550 metres deep. Facilities beyond this depth will 
ŶŽƚďĞĚĞƐƚƌŽǇĞĚďǇƚŚĞǁĞĂƉŽŶ ?ƐƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞǁĂǀĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŶŽƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůŚƵƌĚůĞƐƚŽďƵŝůĚŝŶŐĂƚ
that depth. The DPRK is expert at tunnelling, with a number of its nuclear and military command 
and control facilities reportedly at depths of 300 metres or more.32 
Underground facilities are also difficult to detect and characterize leaving substantial intelligence 
ŐĂƉƐ ?ǀĞŶƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƚĞŶƐŽĨŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĂƌŚĞĂĚƐŵŝŐŚƚŶŽƚĚĞƐƚƌŽǇƚŚĞWZ< ?ƐŶƵĐůĞĂƌ warheads, 
long-range missiles, and command and control infrastructure secured in hardened and deeply 
ďƵƌŝĞĚĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?/ŶƚŚĞǀŝĞǁŽĨZĞĂƌĚŵŝƌĂůDŝĐŚĂĞůƵŵŽŶƚ ?sŝĐĞŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ ?:ŽŝŶƚ^ƚĂĨĨ P “dŚĞŽŶůǇ
                                                            
25 US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, 2018, p. 33. 
26 &ŽƌĂŶŽǀĞƌǀŝĞǁƐĞĞ,ĂŶƐ<ƌŝƐƚĞŶƐĞŶ ? “dŚĞďŝƌƚŚŽĨĂďŽŵď P ? ?-  ? ? ?The Nuclear Information Project, April 2005, 
http://www.nukestrat.com/us/afn/B61-11.htm. 
27 ^ĞĞŚƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĞƌtŽŽůĨ ? “dŚĞKŶůǇĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƌŵƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ ?ƐDŝƐƐŝůĞƵŶŬĞƌƐĂƌĞEƵĐůĞĂƌtĞĂƉŽŶƐ ?^ĂǇƐĂdŽƉtĂƌ
WůĂŶŶĞƌ ? ?Public Radio International, 10 August 2017, https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-08-10/only-effective-arms-against-north-
koreas-missile-bunkers-are-nuclear-weapons-says. 
28 See Franz-^ƚĞĨĂŶ'ĂĚǇ ? “DŝůŝƚĂƌǇ^ƚĂůĞŵĂƚĞ P,ŽǁEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂŽƵůĚtŝŶĂtĂƌtŝƚŚƚŚĞh^ ? ?The Diplomat, 10 October 2017. 
29 h^ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŽĨĞĨĞŶƐĞ ? “ZĞƉŽƌƚŽĨƚŚĞĞĨĞŶƐĞ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞŽĂƌĚdĂƐŬ&ŽƌĐĞŽŶ&ƵƚƵƌĞ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ^ƚƌŝŬĞ&ŽƌĐĞƐ ? ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?
pp. 1.10, 7.11 W7.12. 
30 &ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?dŚŽŵĂƐŽǁůĞƌĂŶĚ:ŽƐĞƉŚ,ŽǁĂƌĚ ? “ŽƵŶƚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞtĞůů-Armed Tyrant: A Modest Proposal for Small Nuclear 
tĞĂƉŽŶƐ ? ?Strategic Review 19: 4, 1991, pp. 34 W40. 
31 /ǀĂŶKĞůƌŝĐŚ ?ůĂŬĞWƵƌŶĞůů ?ĂŶĚ^ĐŽƚƚƌĞǁĞƐ ? “ĂƌƚŚWĞŶĞƚƌĂƚŝŶŐEƵĐůĞĂƌtĂƌŚĞĂĚƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĞĞƉdĂƌŐĞƚƐ PŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ?
ŽƵŶƚĞƌŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ?ĂŶĚŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ? ?Federation of American Scientists, April 2005, p. 22, 
https://fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/newweapons/erthpennuclrwhdsrpt.pdf. 
32 ^ŽŽŶ,Ž>ĞĞ ? “ŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇŵĞƌŝĐĂŶDŝůŝƚĂƌǇdĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇĂŶĚEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ ?Ɛ,ĂƌĚĂŶĚĞĞƉůǇƵƌŝĞĚdĂƌŐĞƚƐ ?,dƐ ) ? ?
Comparative Strategy 32: 5, 2013, pp. 391. 
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ǁĂǇ ƚŽ  ‘ůŽĐĂƚĞ ĂŶĚ ĚĞƐƚƌŽǇ ?with complete certainty ? alů ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ  ?ƚŚĞ WZ< ?Ɛ ? ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ
ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐƉƌŽŐƌĂŵƐ ?ŝƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂŐƌŽƵŶĚŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶ ? ?33  
Moreover, the detonation of high-yield earth-penetrating nuclear weapons at depths of a few 
metres would generate extensive lethal radioactive fallout that would spread across the DPRK, with 
lower levels of radiation likely to reach Japan and the ROK. The explosion would not be contained 
by the penetration of the bomb into the ground but would instead loft a vast amount of irradiated 
earth and surrounding vaporized matter into the air from the roughly 200-metre-wide crater that a 
B61-11 would create.34  
The US might also plan to destroy hardened surface or near-surface WMD facilities and command 
and control bunker complexes using the overpressure created by a nuclear weapon detonated 
above the target, such as Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads (W76-1 and W88), 
Minuteman Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) warheads (W78 and W87) and Air-Launched 
Cruise Missiles (ALCM). If detonated at a height at which the fireball did not touch the ground, local 
radioactive fallout would be much less with little irradiation and dispersion of surface material, but 
the scale of devastation would be significantly greater than detonations a few metres underground. 
Use of these weapons is further complicated by the fact that US ICBMs targeting the DPRK would 
have to overfly the Russian Federation and China; US submarines would need to sail at 
least 2,500 nautical miles from port to avoid overflying the Russian Federation.35  
The use of nuclear weapons to destroy DPRK chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents would 
be very difficult. Any such use risks dispersion of lethal CBW agents. In 2005 the US National 
Academy of Sciences noted that: 
an attack with existing conventional weapons could cause the release in respirable 
form of 0.1 to 5 percent of the agent inventory. Calculations indicate that an attack 
with a nuclear weapon could result in comparable releases if the weapon was 
detonated close to but not within a facility, but much smaller releases if the weapon 
was detonated in the same room as the agent.36 
The key point is that a nuclear explosion could potentially destroy CBW agents, but only if the 
weapon were detonated in the chamber where the chemical or biological weapons are stored.37 
The report also notes that a conventional alternative, the US BLU- ? ? ? ƚŚĞƌŵŽďĂƌŝĐ ďŽŵď ?  “ŝĨ
ĚĞƚŽŶĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĐŚĂŵďĞƌ ?ŵĂǇďĞĂďůĞƚŽĚĞƐƚƌŽǇƚŚĞĂŐĞŶƚ ?38 
The use of nuclear weapons to destroy enemy forces was central to US nuclear doctrine during the 
Cold War when inferiority into terms of conventional forces incentivized NATO to plan for early use 
of battlefield nuclear weapons against an advancing Soviet army in Europe. Nevertheless, their use 
for such a purpose was rejected by US political leaders in the Korean War, Vietnam War, and the 
                                                            
33 Letter to Representative Ted Lieu from Michael Dumont, Vice Director, Joint Staff, 27 October 2015, 
https://lieu.house.gov/sites/lieu.house.gov/files/Response%20to%20TWL-RG%20Letter%20on%20NK.pdf. 
34 /ǀĂŶKĞůƌŝĐŚ ?ůĂŬĞWƵƌŶĞůů ?ĂŶĚ^ĐŽƚƚƌĞǁĞƐ ? “ĂƌƚŚWĞŶĞƚƌĂƚŝŶŐEuclear Warheads against Deep Targets: Concepts, 
ŽƵŶƚĞƌŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ?ĂŶĚŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ? ?Federation of American Scientists, April 2005, p. 22, 
https://fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/newweapons/erthpennuclrwhdsrpt.pdf. Full containment of a generic 300 kiloton weapon 
would require detonation at minimum depth of 800 metres: Committee on the Effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other 
Weapons, Effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other Weapons, National Academy of Sciences, 2005, p. 33. 
35 :ŽƐŚƵĂWŽůůĂĐŬ ? “EƵĐůĞĂƌĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞZĞǀĞŶŐĞŽĨ'ĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ? ?Arms Control Wonk, 24 September 2017, 
https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1204122/nuclear-deterrence-the-revenge-of-geography/. 
36 Committee on the Effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other Weapons, Effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other 
Weapons, National Academy of Sciences, 2005, p. 94. 
37 Ibid., p. 93. 
38 Ibid., p. 111. 
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'ƵůĨtĂƌďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚŵŽƌĂůŽƉƉƌŽďƌŝƵŵ ?dŚŝƐ “ƚĂďŽŽ ?ŽŶŶƵĐůĞĂƌƵƐĞƐĞƌǀĞƐĂƐĂŶ
important political constraint on US behaviour.39 
The case for planning to use nuclear weapons against the DPRK is therefore extremely limited. The 
number of HDBTs that could be successfully destroyed with nuclear weapons is small, with no 
certainty that all targets are known and could indeed be destroyed or disabled. The capacity for 
nuclear weapons to destroy CBW agents is also very limited. Moreover, the use of nuclear weapons 
would not and should not be considered purely in the context of the destruction of specific military 
facilities ? any decision to use nuclear weapons would be momentous, particularly if the US were to 
use them first in a conflict.40 The widespread civilian harm and environmental damage from the 
detonation of high-yield earth-penetrating weapons, and possibly high-yield airburst detonations 
and lower yield tactical nuclear weapons, the lack of warning for surrounding populations given the 
time sensitive nature of attacking such targets with nuclear weapons, and extensive irradiation of 
swathes of the DPRK and potentially Japan, ROK, China, and the Russian Federation very seriously 
undermines the case for nuclear use. This is compounded by the unprecedented international 
condemnation that would follow the use of nuclear weapons by the US, even if it did not initiate 
the conflict.  
The use of nuclear weapons by the US would also set a very dangerous precedent that could be seen 
as legitimizing the use of nuclear weapons in other regional conflicts. Moreover, the use of 
indiscriminate weapons of extreme violence against Koreans would be extremely contentious in the 
ROK. It would also be extremely controversial in Japan as the only State to have suffered a nuclear 
attack.41 
There is also the real risk that other military powers in the region ? China, the Russian Federation, 
and Japan ? would be drawn into a nuclear conflict, increasing its violence, harm, and 
ƵŶƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐGlobal Times, for example, reported that China would not intervene if 
WǇŽŶŐǇĂŶŐ ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚĞĚĂĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ?ďƵƚǁĂƌŶĞĚƚŚĂƚ  “If the US and [ROK] carry out strikes and try to 
overthrow the [DPRK] regime and change the political pattern of the Korean Peninsula, China will 
ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƚŚĞŵĨƌŽŵĚŽŝŶŐƐŽ ? ?42 
Removing nuclear weapons from USʹROK war plans 
The role of nuclear weapons in deterring specific actions (for example, a major attack by the DPRK) 
by threatening specific nuclear attacks (to destroy or disable WMD and command and control HDBTs 
and potentially massed DPRK armed forces) is therefore very limited. The added deterrence value 
of nuclear weapons in the context of the wider and more credible deterrent role of US WROK 
conventional forces and economic pressure may also be legitimately questioned.43  
                                                            
39 EŝŶĂdĂŶŶĞŶǁĂůĚ ? “dŚĞEƵĐůĞĂƌdĂďŽŽ PdŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞEŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞĂƐŝƐŽĨEƵĐůĞĂƌEŽŶ-hƐĞ ? ?International 
Organization 53: 3, 1999, p. 463. 
40 The US would plan on the worst-case assumption that the DPRK leadership would attempt to use some or all of its nuclear 
weapons early in a conflict while it still enjoyed full command and control of its forces, incentivizing early use of nuclear weapons 
by the US in a one-ƐŝĚĞĚŝƚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚĂƚdŚŽŵĂƐ^ĐŚĞůůŝŶŐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ “ƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉƌŽĐĂůĨĞĂƌŽĨƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞĂƚƚĂĐŬ ? in The Strategy of 
Conflict, 1960, pp. 207 W230. See sŝƉŝŶEĂƌĂŶŐĂŶĚŶŬŝƚWĂŶĚĂ ? “dŚŝŶŬŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚEƵĐůĞĂƌŽŵĂŶĚĂŶĚŽŶƚƌŽůŝŶEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ ? ?
The Diplomat, 16 September 2017. 
41 The taboo against nuclear weapons outlined by Nina Tannenwald took hold in the US for a number of reasons, one of which was 
linked to race. The use of nuclear weapons against an Asian population after decades of violence against Arab populations in the 
Middle East would compound critiques of racism in US foreign policy. For example, DĂŚŵŽŽĚDĂŵĚĂŶŝ ? “'ŽŽĚDƵƐůŝŵ ?ĂĚ
DƵƐůŝŵ PWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŽŶƵůƚƵƌĞĂŶĚdĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵ ? ?American Anthropologist 104: 3, 2002, pp. 766 W775; and Randolph 
WĞƌƐĂƵĚ ? “EĞŽ-'ƌĂŵƐĐŝĂŶdŚĞŽƌǇĂŶĚdŚŝƌĚtŽƌůĚsŝŽůĞŶĐĞ PdŝŵĞĨŽƌƌŽĂĚĞŶŝŶŐ ? ?Globalizations 13:5, 2016, pp. 547 W562. 
42 ĚŝƚŽƌŝĂů ? “ZĞĐŬůĞƐƐ'ĂŵĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ<ŽƌĞĂŶWĞŶŝŶƐƵůĂZƵŶƐƚŚĞZŝƐŬŽĨtĂƌ ? ?Global Times, 10 August 2017, 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1060791.shtml. 
43 ^ĞĞĞŶŽŝƚWĞůŽƉŝĚĂƐ ? “ĞƚWŽƌƚƌĂǇĞĚĂƐĂĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ? ?ŝn Shultz, G. and Goodby, J. (eds), The War that Must Never Be Fought, 
2015, p. 9. 
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US WROK conventional forces constitute the overwhelming deterrent threat to the DPRK, including 
forward-deployed US troops, weapon systems and materiel, and major conventional military power 
projection capabilities rotated through the region such as aircraft carrier battle groups, fighter-
bombers, and attack submarines. There is little if any doubt that US WROK forces would defeat the 
DPRK and terminate the Kim dynasty through conventional firepower and blockades even if 
Pyongyang used its chemical and nuclear weapons against the ROK, US, and potentially Japan. The 
US and ROK have standing plans for rapid conventional responses to DPRK aggression that are 
routinely practiced through small-scale exercises and high-profile annual Key Resolve/Foal Eagle and 
Ulchi-Freedom Guardian exercises.44 They are also developing tripartite US WROK WJapan 
response plans.45  
The US cŽƵůĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƌĞĚƵĐĞƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐďǇĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇ  “ĚĞŶƵĐůĞĂƌŝǌŝŶŐ ? ŝƚƐǁĂƌ
plans and decoupling nuclear weapons from deterring DPRK aggression. Explicitly denuclearizing 
war plans and exercises would involve targeting priority HDBTs with conventional weapons. The US 
has developed a suite of earth-penetrating conventional weapons for precisely this purpose. These 
include the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, GBU-28 penetrating warhead, and GBU-24 
Advanced Penetrator Unit thermobaric bomb.46 Disabling rather than destroying HDBTs with 
conventional weapons would likely centre on critical site components within and outside the target, 
such as blast doors, service tunnels, and energy, air and water systems.47  
Explicit assurances to the DPRK on nuclear use and preventative war  
In addition to formally removing nuclear weapons from war plans and exercises, the US could reduce 
incentives for Pyongyang to use nuclear weapons first and early in an escalating crisis by providing 
explicit reassurances to Pyongyang that the US and ROK will never use nuclear weapons against it, 
or attempt military-led regime change, unless Pyongyang launches a major attack on the US or ROK. 
This would be the equivalent of a negative security assurance that the US will never use its nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear-armed States except under very specific conditions, only this time 
from a nuclear-armed State to a nuclear-armed State. This could include a commitment not to 
launch a limited, conventional, preventative attack against the DPRK. The irony here is that the 
development of nuclear weapons by the DPRK to deter the US WROK from doing something they 
have little intention of doing (invading and occupying the DPRK) has become a profound cause of 
regime insecurity for Pyongyang. It enhances the attractiveness of limited preventative strikes that 
ĐŽƵůĚ ĞƐĐĂůĂƚĞ ƚŽ ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇ ƚŚĞ ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ WZ< ?Ɛ ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ǁĂƐ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ƚŽ
prevent. 
An explicit security assurance is not an aberrant suggestion. In August 2017, for example, US 
^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨĞĨĞŶƐĞ:ĂŵĞƐDĂƚƚŝƐĂŶĚh^^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞZĞǆdŝůůĞƌƐŽŶŝŶƐŝƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ “The U.S. 
ŚĂƐ ŶŽ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ŝŶ ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ Žƌ ĂĐĐĞůĞƌĂƚĞĚ ƌĞƵŶŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ <ŽƌĞĂ ? ?48 Moreover, steps to 
normalize the US WDPRK relationship in ways that diminish the threat of US-led regime change have 
                                                            
44 Park Byung-ƐƵ ? “^ ?<ŽƌĞĂŶĂŶĚh^ŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝĞƐĚƌĂǁƵƉĂŶĞǁŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƉůĂŶ ? ?Hankyoreh, 28 April 2015, 
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/706442.html; Choe Sang-ŚƵŶ ? “^ŽƵƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂWůĂŶƐ ‘ĞĐĂƉŝƚĂƚŝŽŶhŶŝƚ ?
ƚŽdƌǇƚŽ^ĐĂƌĞEŽƌƚŚ ?Ɛ>ĞĂĚĞƌƐ ? ?New York Times, 12 September 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/world/asia/north-
south-korea-decapitation-.html. The ROK outlined a new set of plans in its 2016 Defense White Paper to deter and counter any 
DPRK aggression: Kill Chain, Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR). 
Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, Seoul, December 2016, pp. 69 W73. 
45  “^ŽƵƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ ?:ĂƉĂŶǆƚĞŶĚDŝůŝƚĂƌǇ/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞWĂĐƚ ? ?Nikkei Asian Review, 26 August 2017, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-
Economy/International-Relations/South-Korea-Japan-extend-military-intelligence-pact. 
46 Committee on the Effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other Weapons, Effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other 
Weapons, National Academy of Sciences, 2005, pp. 100 W102. 
47 ^ĞĞĞŶŶŝƐ'ŽƌŵůĞǇ ? “&ŽƌĐĞ/ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ'ůŽďĂů^ƚƌŝŬĞ ? ?ŝŶtŝƌƚǌ ?: ?ĂŶĚ>ĂƌƐĞŶ ?: ? ?ĞĚƐ ) ?Nuclear Transformation: The New U.S. 
Nuclear Doctrine, 2005, p. 57. 
48 :ĂŵĞƐDĂƚƚŝƐĂŶĚZĞǆdŝůůĞƌƐŽŶ ? “tĞ ?ƌĞ,ŽůĚŝŶŐWǇŽŶŐǇĂŶŐƚŽĐĐŽƵŶƚ ? ?The Wall Street Journal, 13 August 2017, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/were-holding-pyongyang-to-account-1502660253. 
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been a consistent feature of their episodic diplomatic engagement, and undoubtedly will be again 
in any future negotiations. The 1994 Agreed Framework included commitments to work towards 
full political and economic relations and formal US assurances to the DPRK that it would not use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons. The review of policy towards the DPRK under President Bill Clinton 
by Secretary of Defense William Perry recommended a new strategy of step-by-step progress to 
comprehensive normalization and a peace treaty with the DPRK.49 In a subsequent joint US WDPRK 
communique following the historic visit of DPRK Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok to the White House, 
ďŽƚŚ ƐŝĚĞƐ ĂŐƌĞĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  “ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ŚŽƐtile intent toward the other and 
confirmed the commitment of both governments to make every effort in the future to build a new 
relaƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉĨƌĞĞĨƌŽŵƉĂƐƚĞŶŵŝƚǇ ? ?50 
The US and DPRK also agreed through the 2005 Joint Statement of the six-party talks with the ROK, 
Japan, the Russian Federation ? ĂŶĚ ŚŝŶĂ ƚŽ  “ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ĞĂĐŚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ? ĞǆŝƐƚ ƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůůǇ
together and take steps to normalize their relations subject tŽƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞďŝůĂƚĞƌĂůƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?
ĂŶĚ “ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĂƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚƉĞĂĐĞƌĞŐŝŵĞŽŶƚŚĞ<ŽƌĞĂŶWĞŶŝŶƐƵůĂ ? ?dŚĞh^ĂůƐŽ “ĂĨĨŝƌŵĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚ
has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK 
with nuclear or conventiŽŶĂůǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ? ?51 
Non-proliferation and reassurance of the ROK 
US nuclear weapons are seen to serve a second purpose beyond deterrence of DPRK aggression ?
that of reassuring the ROK. A core argument here is that absent US nuclear guarantees, US allies like 
the ROK would procure their own independent nuclear arsenals.52 As the 2018 US Nuclear Posture 
ZĞǀŝĞǁƉƵƚŝƚ ? “ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĂƐƐƵƌŝŶŐĂůůŝĞƐĂŶĚƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐĚĞƉĞŶĚƐŽŶƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞĐƌĞĚŝďŝůŝƚǇ
of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. They have reaffirmed that extended nuclear deterrence is 
ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůƚŽƚŚĞŝƌƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ĞŶĂďůŝŶŐŵŽƐƚƚŽĞƐĐŚĞǁƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ ? ?53  
ƵƚƚŚĞƌĞĂƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŝƐƌĞĚƵĐƚŝǀĞ ?/ƚůŝŵŝƚƐ^ĞŽƵů ?ƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĐŚŽŝĐĞƐƚŽĞŝƚŚĞƌ a US 
nuclear guarantee or an indigenous nuclear capability. Both choices are nuclear with non-nuclear 
alternatives discounted.54 Despite calls for either the reintroduction of US nuclear weapons or an 
indigenous programme55, the idea of a ROK nuclear weapons programme to counter the DPRK is 
politically and strategically problematic. Politically, it would require the ROK to withdraw from the 
NPT, as the DPRK has done, and disrupt its political relationships with China, Japan, and many other 
States, perhaps radically so (and which might prompt other States such as Japan to develop their 
own nuclear weapons). Strategically, a mutual nuclear deterrence relationship on the Korean 
peninsula would be dangerous given the risk of inadvertent and rapid escalation to nuclear violence 
                                                            
49 tŝůůŝĂŵWĞƌƌǇ ? “dŚĞEŽƌƚŚ Korean Policy Review: What HappĞŶĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ?
http://www.wjperryproject.org/notes-from-the-brink/the-north-korean-policy-review-what-happened-in-1999; William Perry, 
 “ZĞǀŝĞǁŽĨhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐWŽůŝĐǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ P&ŝŶĚŝŶŐƐĂŶĚZĞĐŽmmeŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/nk20.pdf. 
50 h^ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞ ? “h ?^ ?- W ?Z ?< ?:ŽŝŶƚŽŵŵƵŶŝƋƵĞ ? ? ? ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?https://1997-
2001.state.gov/regions/eap/001012_usdprk_jointcom.html. 
51  “:ŽŝŶƚ^ƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ&ŽƵrth Round of the Six-PaƌƚǇdĂůŬƐ ? ? ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Reports/Northkorea/JointStatement.shtml. 
52 ŽďŝŶŚŽƌŶĂŶĚƵǇĞŽŶ<ŝŵ ? “tŝůů^ŽƵƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ'ŽEƵĐůĞĂƌ ? ? ?Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 15 August 2016, 
https://thebulletin.org/will-south-korea-go-nuclear9778; ĂǀŝĚDĐEĞŝů ? “ĂůůĨŽƌ:ĂƉĂŶƚŽŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŶĚƚŽEŽŶ-nuclear Principles 
ƵĞƚŽE<ŽƌĞĂ ? ?The Irish Times, 7 September 2017, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/asia-pacific/call-for-japan-to-
consider-end-to-non-nuclear-principles-due-to-n-korea-1.3212640. 
53 US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, 2018, p. 23. 
54 ^ĞĞĞŶŽŝƚWĞůŽƉŝĚĂƐ ? “dŚĞEƵĐůĞĂƌ^ƚƌĂŝƚũĂĐŬĞƚ ? ?ŝŶsŽŶ,ůĂƚŬǇ ?^ ?ĂŶĚtĞŶŐĞƌ ? ? ?ĞĚƐ ) ?The Future of Extended Deterrence, 
2015, pp. 73 W105. 
55 ^ĞĞ “DĂŝŶŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƉĂƌƚǇĂĚŽƉƚƐh ?^ ?ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůŶƵŬĞƌĞĚĞƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚĂƐŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƉĂƌƚǇůŝŶĞ ?Yonhap News, 16 August 2017, 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2017/08/16/0301000000AEN20170816007851315.html. ^ĞĞĂůƐŽZŝĐŚĂƌĚ^ŽŬŽůƐŬǇ ? “dŚĞ
&ŽůůǇŽĨĞƉůŽǇŝŶŐh ?^ ?dĂĐƚŝĐĂůEƵĐůĞĂƌtĞĂƉŽŶƐƚŽ^ŽƵƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ ? ?Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1 December 2017, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/12/01/folly-of-deploying-u.s.-tactical-nuclear-weapons-to-south-korea-pub-74900.  
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compounded by the absence of early warning, leadership misperception, limited communication, 
ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ WZ< ?Ɛ ŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚǇ ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ ƚŽ ďĞ Ăŝŵed at deterring Washington, 
not Seoul.  
Nuclear reassurance of Seoul by Washington as a solution to the possibility of nuclear coercion by 
the DPRK is also overplayed. The DPRK might try to use its nuclear capabilities for coercion, but the 
empirical record on nuclear coercion suggests that it will be ineffective.56 Nuclear weapons might 
also embolden the DPRK to engage in riskier conventional attacks, although it already has a long 
history of conventional violence against the ROK, including attempting to assassinate presidents, 
downing of commercial airliners, shelling of territory, and sinking of warships.57 This pattern of 
behaviour may well continue, but US nuclear weapons (and ROK nuclear weapons were Seoul to 
develop them) are of little relevance in preventing or deterring lower-level military confrontations 
that the DPRK might initiate given the depth and breadth of US WROK conventional responses. The 
reassurance role played by US nuclear weapons is therefore overplayed in the context of the wider 
defence relationship and far more credible conventional deterrence commitment of the US.  
Reducing the role of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula therefore suggests an important role 
for ROK citizens, parliamentarians, and media. They can play an important part in marginalizing 
nuclear weapons in US WROK war planning and military exercises because of the lack of utility of 
these weapons and the appalling effects of nuclear use. This would require specific ROK 
understandings of what constitutes a credible non-nuclear security assurance from the US that 
eschews any role for nuclear weapons. They could also go an important step further and 
delegitimize nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence for the US, ROK, and DPRK as dangerous and 
destabilizing weapons that risk unprecedented civilian harm, environmental destruction, and 
economic ruin if used. This could be incorporated into President Moon Jae-ŝŶ ?Ɛ “^ƵŶƐŚŝŶĞ ? ? ? ?ƉŽůŝĐǇ
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞWZ<ƚŚĂƚƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐĞŶĚƵƌŝŶŐ “ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇŶŽƌŵƐ ?ŽĨƚŽůĞƌĂŶĐĞĂŶĚĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?58 It would 
build on the expansion of the US WROK alliance beyond military patronage to a much deeper 
partnership encompassing a global foreign policy agenda, one in which US nuclear weapons are of 
diminishing relevance.59 Citizens, parliamentarians, and media in Japan could adopt a similar 
strategy in the context of the US WJapan security relationship and the DPRK. This would necessarily 
ĨƌĂŵĞŶƵĐůĞĂƌĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƉĞŶŝŶƐƵůĂ ?ƐƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƉƌŽďůĞŵƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ
solution. This is important because by explicitly or tacitly supporting a role for US nuclear weapons 
in their national security, the ROK and Japan reinforce the value of nuclear weapons in global politics 
and the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence for all States that feel similarly insecure ? including 
the DPRK. 
Steps the DPRK and China could take to reduce  
the role of nuclear weapons in the current confrontation  
As explained at the outset, this paper has primarily concerned itself with steps the US could take to 
reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its confrontation with the DPRK. Nevertheless, the onus for 
taking such steps falls on all parties to the 1953 armistice: the DPRK, the US (representing United 
                                                            
56 See Todd SĞĐŚƐĞƌĂŶĚDĂƚƚŚĞǁ&ƵŚƌŵĂŶ ? “ƌŝƐŝƐĂƌŐĂŝŶŝŶŐĂŶĚEƵĐůĞĂƌůĂĐŬŵĂŝů ? ?International Organization 67:1, 2013, 
p.  ? ? ? ?:ĂĐĞŬ<ƵŐůĞƌ ? “dĞƌƌŽƌǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞ ?, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 28:3, 1984, pp. 479 W482; Michael MccGwire, 
 “/ƐdŚĞƌĞĂ&ƵƚƵƌĞĨŽƌEƵĐůĞĂƌtĞĂƉŽŶƐ ? ?International Affairs 70: 2, 1994, p. 214. 
57 ^ĞĞŶƚŚŽŶǇŽƌĚĞƐŵĂŶ ? “dŚĞDŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂůĂŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞ<ŽƌĞĂƐĂŶĚEŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂ ? ?ĞŶƚĞƌĨŽƌ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ƚƵĚŝĞs, 
January 2017, pp. 1 W5. 
58 Key-zĞŽƵŶŐ^ŽŶ ? “Entrenching  ‘/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇEŽƌŵƐ ?ŽĨdŽůĞƌĂŶĐĞĂŶĚŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ P>ĞƐƐŽŶƐĨƌŽŵZĂƉƉƌŽĐŚĞŵĞŶƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶEŽƌƚŚĂŶĚ
^ŽƵƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ ? ?Review of International Studies 33, 2007, pp. 489 W509. 
59 ^ĞĞdŚĞtŚŝƚĞ,ŽƵƐĞ ? “dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ-Republic of Korea Alliance: Shared Values, New FrontieƌƐ ? ? ? ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/16/joint-fact-sheet-united-states-republic-korea-alliance-shared-
values-new. 
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Nations Command), and China. Each has a responsibility to manage the conflict in ways that 
preclude open war, especially nuclear war.  
There are three specific steps the DPRK could take in the short term to reduce the role of nuclear 
weapons in the current phase of the confrontation. First, Pyongyang could declare a moratorium on 
nuclear tests and long-range ballistic missile tests, as it did in the past in the context of its long-range 
missile tests from September 1999 until July 2006. Second, it could publish a formal declaratory 
nuclear policy, for the purposes of transparency and predictability, on the conditions under which 
it would consider using its nuclear weapons, including a commitment to no-first-use and a negative 
security assurance that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear armed 
States.60 Third, it could develop detailed and practical proposals for a peace treaty to replace 
the 1953 Armistice Agreement with the US that builds on its previous statements, including how it 
might be negotiated, and the effects of a peace agreement on its nuclear and ballistic missile 
programmes.61 This could include a process by which it would re-join the NPT (which it left in 2003) 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (which it left in 1994). It is here that pressure from 
Beijing could be usefully and plausibly applied.  
These suggestions tacitly recognize the DPRK as a nuclear-armed State and could be rejected for 
legitimizing that status. This would be wrong-headed. The DPRK is a de facto nuclear-armed State, 
albeit one with a basic capability, and managing the confrontation in ways that reduce the risks of 
nuclear violence means engaging with that reality.62 However, one could ask the same question of 
the DPRK as the one asked here of the US: does it need nuclear weapons to deter attack? Space 
precludes a detailed consideration, but a case can be made that the harm the DPRK could inflict on 
Seoul and US citizens and armed forces in the ROK with its conventional capabilities is sufficient, 
given the interests at stake for the US.63  
China also has a wider to role to play, potentially in coordination with the US. Although China has 
not threatened to use nuclear weapons in the context of war on the Korean peninsula, there are 
three ways in which it could have an indirect effect to reduce the risk of nuclear violence. First, it 
could use economic pressure to persuade the DPRK not to conduct any further nuclear weapons 
and long-range ballistic missile tests. Quite how far China is prepared to go beyond recent steps to 
support United Nations sanctions ? and how receptive the DPRK would be to Chinese pressure ?
remains unclear. Notably since the death of Kim Jong-il, there are indications the relationship has 
cooled between Beijing and Pyongyang. The relationship appears to be primarily economic and 
strategic rather than fraternal, despite routine references to their 1961 Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance and a common history of communist struggle.64 
Second, Beijing could play an important crisis management role through facilitation of dialogue. This 
would build on its decision to initiate what became the six-party talks that began with an initial 
meeting in Beijing in April 2003 between China, the US, and the DPRK to forestall a crisis over 
WǇŽŶŐǇĂŶŐ ?ƐŶƵĐůĞĂƌƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ?DĂŶĂŐŝŶŐĂŶĚĚĞ-escalating dangerous phases of the US WROK W
DPRK conflict is a core interest for China. It seeks to avoid a war on the peninsula into which it could 
                                                            
60 ƐsŝƉŝŶEĂƌĂŶŐĂŶĚŶŬŝƚWĂŶĚĂƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶ “dŚŝŶŬŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚEƵĐůĞĂƌŽŵŵĂŶĚĂŶĚŽŶƚƌŽůŝŶEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ ? ?The Diplomat, 
16 September 2017. For example, in May 2016 during the ƐĞǀĞŶƚŚtŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?WĂƌƚǇŽĨ<ŽƌĞĂŽŶŐƌĞƐƐ ?<ŝŵ:ŽŶŐ-un declared that the 
WZ< “ǁŝůůŶŽƚƵƐĞĂŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƵŶůĞƐƐŝƚƐƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇŝƐĞŶĐƌŽĂĐŚĞĚƵƉŽŶďǇĂŶǇĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞŚŽƐƚŝůĞĨŽƌĐĞƐǁŝƚŚŶƵŬĞƐ ?ĂƐ it 
ŚĂĚĂůƌĞĂĚǇĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚ ? ?ZŽďĞƌƚŽĞŶĚŝŶŝ ? “EŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ PSeventh Party Congress Enshrines Nuclear Ambitions but Says Little about 
ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐZĞĨŽƌŵ ? ?ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂůĨŽƌǆƚĞƌŶĂůWŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? 
61 See  ?^ŚŝŶ ? “EŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ ?ƐWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŝŶŝƚƐƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĨŽƌĂWĞĂĐĞdƌĞĂƚǇ ? ?Asian Affairs 48: 3, 2017, pp. 510 W528.  
62 DŝĐŚĂĞů^ǁĂŝŶĞŵĂŬĞƐƚŚŝƐƉŽŝŶƚŝŶ “dŝŵĞƚŽĐĐĞƉƚZĞĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚDĂŶĂŐĞĂEƵĐůĞĂƌ-ĂƌŵĞĚEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ ? ?ĂƌŶĞŐŝĞŶĚŽǁŵĞŶƚĨŽƌ
International Peace, 11 September 2017, http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/09/11/time-to-accept-reality-and-manage-nuclear-
armed-north-korea-pub-73065. 
63 Jonathan Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International Security, Adelphi paper 418, 2010, p. 194. 
64 ůĞĂŶŽƌůďĞƌƚ ? “dŚĞŚŝŶĂ WEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? ?CFR Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, 27 September 2017, 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship.  
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be dragged, which would certainly affect its economic growth priorities, and could cause a collapse 
of the DPRK ? something Beijing has said it will not accept ?ĞŝũŝŶŐ ?Ɛ  “ĨƌĞĞǌĞ-for-ĨƌĞĞǌĞ ?ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂů
outlined in March 2017 to suspend DPRK missile and nuclear activities in exchange for the halting 
of increasingly large-scale US WROK military exercises was the latest example of this approach.65 
Third, and relatedly, Beijing could extend a formal positive security assurance to the DPRK in the 
context of any future multilateral negotiations, but conditional upon no-first-use of nuclear 
ǁĞĂƉŽŶƐĂƚĂŵŝŶŝŵƵŵ ?ĞŝũŝŶŐŚĂƐĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚǁŚĂƚ:ŽŚŶWĂƌŬĐĂůůƐĂ “ƌĞŐŝŵĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞ ?
to Pyongyang through a Communist Party of China WtŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?WĂƌƚǇŽĨ<ŽƌĞĂƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞ
mid- ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? ,Ğ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐ ƚŚŝƐ ĂƐ Ă  “ƉĂĐŬĂŐĞ ĚĞĂů ? ƚŚĂƚ ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ƐƵƌǀŝǀĂů ĂŶĚ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
development assistance for nuclear restraint. The dynastic accession of Kim Jong-un and his 
provocative nuclear and missile tests have strained this deal.66 
Quite how far China might be prepared to go to coerce the DPRK to relinquish its nuclear arsenal 
altogether, for example by suspending aid, fully implementing United Nations sanctions, or 
terminating trade altogether, is uncertain. Steps that risk the collapse of the DPRK will not be 
ĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚĂŶĚŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽĂĐƚŝƐŽĨƚĞŶŽǀĞƌƐƚĂƚĞĚ ?67 This has prompted a number of analysts 
ƚŽƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĂ “ŐƌĂŶĚďĂƌŐĂŝŶ ?ďĞtween the US and China to resolve or transform their main points 
of strategic and economic confrontation, which would include denuclearization of the DPRK.68 
Conclusion 
Nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence have become embedded in the conflict between the US W
ROK and DPRK. The risk of escalation to nuclear use is real, with dangerous incentives for use early 
in a conflict. The US, in partnership with the ROK, could take a number of measures, outlined in 
detail above, to reduce the role of nuclear weapons:  
1. Explicitly removing nuclear weapons from war plans and exercises;  
2. Extending formal assurances to the DPRK against nuclear attack or preventative conventional 
attack provided the DPRK does not launch a major attack against the US or its allies (noting 
that even under such conditions the use by the US of nuclear weapons would be unnecessary 
and widely condemned); and 
3. Steps by the ROK and Japan to categorically eschew the nuclear component of their extended 
deterrence relationships. 
The DPRK could also take a number of steps to reduce the risk of nuclear violence and China, too, 
has an important, if less direct, role to play in incentivizing DPRK restraint, crisis management, and 
the provision of positive security assurances to Pyongyang.  
These suggestions run counter to Cold War thinking that says only nuclear weapons can deter 
nuclear weapons. For this reason, they are likely to face serious political opposition. Nevertheless, 
the relationship between deterrence and nuclear weapons in US thinking started to shift in 
the  ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ĂĨƚĞƌ ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ? ǁŝƚŚ Ă ŶĞǁ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ ŽŶ  “ƚĂŝůŽƌĞĚ ĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞ ?
encompassing all elements ? conventional, nuclear and non-military ? in a deterrence strategy. This 
paper suggests that the US and ROK develop a tailored deterrence strategy for the DPRK without 
                                                            
65 DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇŽĨ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĨĨĂŝƌƐŽĨƚŚĞWĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐZĞƉƵďůŝĐŽĨŚŝŶĂ ? “&ŽƌĞŝŐŶDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌtĂŶŐzŝDĞĞƚƐƚŚĞWƌĞƐƐ ? ? ?DĂƌĐŚ ? ? ? ? ?
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1444204.shtml. 
66 John Park,  “ƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞZŽůĞŽĨ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞƐŝŶĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ ? ?ŝŶ<ŶŽƉĨ ?: ? ?ĞĚ ? ) ?Security Assurances and 
Nuclear Nonproliferation, 2012, pp. 189 W218. 
67 &ŽƌĂŶŽǀĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?ƐĞĞZŝĐŚĂƌĚ>ůŽǇĚWĂƌƌǇ ? “ĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞWǇŽŶŐǇĂŶŐ ? ?London Review of Books 35:9, 9 May 2013, 
https://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n09/richard-lloydparry/advantage-pyongyang. 
68 For example, ŚĂƌůĞƐ'ůĂƐĞƌ ? “h ?^ ?-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice betwĞĞŶDŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĐĐŽŵŵŽĚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?
International Security 39: 4, 2015, pp. 49 W90.!
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nuclear weapons as an interim step pending the negotiation of a peace agreement to replace the 
current armistice and denuclearize the DPRK ? a formidable task. Nevertheless, there is some hope 
at the time of writing that a planned meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un could herald 
a new negotiation process. Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts with nuclear-
armed adversaries is very difficult. But it is a necessary step on the long-term path towards the 
global elimination of nuclear weapons as the only assured way of removing the risk of 
nuclear violence. 
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Reducing the Role of Nuclear Weapons  
in North East Asia  
Nick Ritchie 
In August 2017 a roundtable experts and former officials met in 
Hiroshima, Japan to discuss pathways towards nuclear disarmament in 
North East Asia. The deterioration in US WDPRK relations in 2017 
ƉƌĞĐŝƉŝƚĂƚĞĚ ďǇ WǇŽŶŐǇĂŶŐ ?s technological advances in thermonuclear 
weapons and long-range ballistic missiles featured heavily.  
dŚĞ,ŝƌŽƐŚŝŵĂZŽƵŶĚƚĂďůĞŚĂŝƌŵĂŶ ?ƐĐŽŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐƵŐĞƐƚĞĚ
that to deter the DPRK, the US and its allies need not rely, or state publicly 
their reliance, on nuclear weapons due to the range of conventional 
deterrence options at their disposal. In consequence, this paper was 
commissioned by UNIDIR and the Hiroshima Prefecture, primarily to 
examine steps the US, alongside the ROK, could take to reduce the role 
of nuclear weapons in its strategy towards the DPRK. 
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